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I. Introduction
On January 18, 2012, an estimated 75,000 websites coordinated a
protest against two United States bills, the Stop Online Piracy Act
("SOPA") and the Protect IP Act ("PIPA"), introduced to crack
down on Internet copyright and intellectual property violations.
Proponents of the bills assert that the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), the current Internet copyright protection law, lacks the

University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.
1. Chenda Ngak, SOPA and PIPA Internet Blackout Aftermath, Staggering
19, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162Numbers, CBS NEWS (Jan.
57361906-501465/sopa-and-pipa-Internet-blackout-aftermath-staggering-numbers/.
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necessary enforcement tools to protect copyrights.2 On the other
hand, opponents claim that the proposed legislation threatens free
speech and innovation, while bypassing the designed DMCA safe
harbor. In the face of such staunch opposition, Congress postponed
voting on the proposed bills.
However, the proposed bills and the public backlash have
neglected another safe harbor afforded to Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") and websites. Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 ("CDA") provides a safe harbor for websites and ISPs for
any content that they do not create or develop.' Therefore, the CDA
shelters ISPs from defamation, tort, and civil rights laws that apply to
traditional print, radio, or television.6
Congress enacted the CDA as part of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, due to concerns over pornography on the Internet.'
Section 230 was added to support and encourage the proliferation of
information on the Internet.! However, this section of the CDA has
since developed into one of the most influential cyberspace laws
protecting websites and ISPs from liability.9 State and federal courts
have interpreted section 230 protection expansively, conferring broad
immunity upon websites,0 including immunity for violations of the
Fair Housing Act ("FHA")." This is especially significant because
"the Internet has become 'a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication'" in the two decades since the
CDA's enactment.1

2. Stephanie Condon, SOPA, PIPA: What you need to know, CBS NEWS (Jan. 18,
2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57360665-503544/sopa-pipa-what-youneed-to-know/.2.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.").
6. James D. Shanahan, Rethinking the Communications Decency Act: Eliminating
Statutory Protections of Discriminatory Housing Advertisements on the Internet, 60 FED.
COMM. L.J. 135,139 (2007).
7. See 141 CONG. REC. 3203 (1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (2012)
9. David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 371, 373 (2010).
10. Id.
11. See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
12. Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 332 (2002).
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This note contends that Congress needs to implement equivalent
sanctions for websites and traditional media, and is organized as
follows: Part II of this note will explain common law defamation and
the section 230's departure from it. Part III will explore the history of
the CDA and how it has evolved into an all-encompassing liability
shield for online entities. Part IV will describe the current problems
created by the court's application of the CDA and the unfair
advantage websites have over traditional print media. Part V will
analyze previous proposed solutions, and Section six recommends a
new approach to this problem.
II. Defamation Law
"Common law defamation typically requires a showing of a
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, publication to a thirdparty, and damages," as well as some showing of fault on behalf of the
publisher. " There are three categories of liability: (1) primary
publisher and original author, (2) distributor liability, and 3) mere
conduits.14 There are different levels of scrutiny for each level."
Publishers are in the same category as original authors because
publishers amplify the damages created by the author through lack of
supervision and oversight." Distributors are somewhere in between
the first two categories and require a heightened showing of fault to
impose liability." Mere conduits are at the other end of the spectrum
because they have little to no culpability in facilitating defamation."
Therefore, it was significant that prior to the CDA, the court in
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy held that ISPs were publishers under

common law defamation. 9 In Stratton-Oakmont, a Prodigy Services,
an Internet company that operated an online bulletin board, faced a

defamation suit.20 The court held that Prodigy implemented "control
13. Virginia A. Fitt, Crowdsourcing the News: News Organization Liability For
iReporters, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1839, 1849 (2011).
14. Id. at 1849-50.
15. Susan Freiwald, Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARv. J.L. & TEC. 569, 588-90 (2001) (citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1997)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 589 (holding that conduits maintain "too tenuous a connection to the
harmful conduct to be held liable," because they have no have "no opportunity to prevent
the publication through their normal business practices").
19. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *6-7, *10 (1995)
(inferring that ISPs can be held to the same liability as the writers).
20. Id. at *2.
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through its automatic software screening program." 21 It was
"Prodigy's affirmative action to police or attempt to control content
published on its [website] that gave rise to this tort liability."22
Therefore, according to one commentator, "[u]nder Stratton, any
attempts to monitor the hundreds of thousands of postings could
potentially lead to liability for claims in which being defined as a
'publisher' is an essential element." 23 Fearing that ISPs and websites
would stop monitoring third party posts to avoid liability for
defamation claims, Congress enacted the CDA.2 4
III. History of the Communications Decency Act
The congressional intent for the CDA was to "remove the
disincentive to police content and to encourage the dissemination of
words and ideas on the Internet."25 Congress feared that the holding
from Stratton would discourage "the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies" to restrict children's access to
inappropriate online material.26 Congress also meant to "avoid the
chilling effect upon Internet free speech that would be occasioned by
the imposition of ... liability upon companies that do not create
potentially harmful messages but are simply intermediaries for their
delivery."27 Therefore, Congress enacted section 223 of the CDA to
criminalize the transmission of obscene, indecent, or offensive
material to minors, 28 and section 230 to provide immunity to ISPs for
their attempts to restrict access. 29 Congress especially noted that ISPs
cannot be "treated as the publisher or speaker."30 However, the court
in ACLU v. Reno struck down section 223, holding that it was not

21. Id. at *10 ("By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes from
its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and bad taste . . . Prodigy is

clearly making decisions as to content.").
22. See Shanahan,supra note 6, at 137-38.
23. Id. at 138.
24. Section 230 was specifically drafted to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy,
which treated ISPs as publishers, and to protect freedom of speech "in the new and
burgeoning Internet medium." Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
25. See Shanahan,supra note 6, at 138.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2012).
27. Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal.App. 4th 790, 802-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
30. Id.
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narrowly tailored enough." Even though section 230 was meant as a
counterpart to section 223, it was left intact by the court.3 2

Section 230 provides ISPs with immunity for their attempts to
restrict access to indecent material 33 and provides that ISPs cannot be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any distributed material.34
Namely, there are three elements that are required for
immunity under the CDA: the defendant must be a provider
or user of an interactive computer service, the asserted claims
must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of the
information and the information must be provided by another
information content provider.35
Therefore, a website is not liable for any content posted by an
independent third party.
IV. Broad Expansion of the CDA and Lack of Liability for
Tort Claims
By granting websites broad immunity, courts have deviated from
Congress's objective of encouraging websites to self-regulate.3 6
Courts have relied upon the "anti-regulatory, pro-market findings" of
the statute to develop an expansive interpretation of section 230."
This has relieved ISPs and websites of any incentive to self monitor
because "websites and ISPs know that ... complaints from aggrieved
parties will be to no avail, even after notice."38 Therefore, "courts
have given these provisions outsized significance, distorting rather
than furthering section 230's original purpose."3 9
A year after the CDA went into effect, the Fourth Circuit set the
precedent for the expansive reading of section 230 in Zeran v.

31. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 879 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
33. Section 230(c)(1) states that "no provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker provided by another information
content provider." Id.
34. Id.
35. See Shanahan,supra note 6, at 139 (citing 47 U.S.C. §230(f)).
36. See Lukmire, supranote 9, at 381.
37. Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2007), affd, 528 F.3d
413 (5th Cir. 2008).
38. See Lukmire, supra note, at 403.
39. Id. at 383.

460

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L..

[[35:3

America Online.40 The court held that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content
provider," 41 and that section 230(c)(2) conferred immunity on
websites and ISPs for non-defamation-based claims.42 In David
Lukmire's incisive critique of Zeran, he argues that the court's
holding that the statute granted immunity to websites and ISPs for
other tort claims has "virtually no support in the text or history of the

statute." 43
In Zeran, the plaintiff received a large number of threatening and
angry calls due to a third party post on an America Online ("AOL")
bulletin board.4 Zeran contacted AOL, but AOL refused to retract
the posting, and further postings were placed on the board.45 Zeran
sued for negligence based on the theory of distributor liability,
claiming that once notified, AOL had a duty to remove the
defamatory postings promptly and to screen defamatory material in
the future, just as a bookstore would be obligated to act as a
distributor of defamatory content.46 On appeal, Zeran claimed that
"distributor" liability is different from the "publisher" liability, and
therefore is not covered by the section 230 safe harbor.47 However,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the case on the basis that
the section 230 immunity includes all state law defamation claims,
even for distributors.48
In Patentwizard,Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., the District Court of South

Dakota followed the Zeran precedent and held that, even though
Kinko's would be responsible for the allegedly defamatory content
published by its users under distributor liability, section 230 grants
them immunity. 49 Therefore, Patentwizard cemented the idea that
distributor liability is a derivative of publisher liability."o

40. Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Zeran has been "cited over 1,400
times, virtually every subsequent opinion regarding section 230 references." Id. at 384.
41. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-32.
42. Id. at 330.
43. See, Lukmire, supra note 9, at 385.
44. Id. at 329.
45.

Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 334.
Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069,1072 (D.S.D. 2001).
Id.
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Courts have also relied on the Zeran holding to immunize ISPs
and websites on a broad range of other claims." The District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Parker v. Google,
Inc., that section 230 barred the claim that Google facilitated the
invasion of plaintiff's privacy by generating an unauthorized
biography when a user enters his name in a search query.52 Since
Parker, the court has extended section 230 immunity to breach of
contract claims," held that ordinary negligence was unrecoverable,54
and extended immunity all the way to the distribution of child
pornography." These holdings distort the original intent of the CDA
to eliminate indecent materials from the Internet.
V. No Liability for Civil Rights Violations
The courts' reliance upon the anti-regulatory, pro-market56
comments of section 230 has even led to immunity for ISPs and
websites against federal civil rights claims." Courts have granted
immunity to ISPs and websites under section 230 against both Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and the FHA.5 9
In Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., Noah, a Muslim, claimed that

AOL "wrongfully refused to prevent participants in an online chat
room from posting or submitting harassing comments that
blasphemed and defamed plaintiff's Islamic religion" in violation of
51. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
computer matchmaking services are immune from claims arising out of false content in a
dating profile provided by someone posing as another person; Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d
655 (7th Cir. 2003) (asserting that a service provider does not need to take reasonable
care to prevent injury to third parties); Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. App.
2001) (broadening section 230 to include negligent misrepresentation and tortious
interference).
52. Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
53. Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2000).
54. Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D.
Cal.).
55. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at 2, 5 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2006).
56. Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff'd, 528 F.3d
413 (5th Cir. 2008).
57. The immunity provided by the CDA has even led to a "reduction in the
effectiveness of the prohibition on discriminatory housing advertisements under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA)." Shanahan, supra note 7 at 146 (referring to Noah v. AOL Time
Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (E.D. Va. 2003)). Shanahan, supra note 6 at 146
(citing to Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
58. Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
59. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 682 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Noah asserted that the other
users were in direct violation of the Member Agreement and
Community Guidelines established by AOL, thus creating a duty for
AOL to enforce the agreement.6 ' However, the court held that
section 230 protects ISPs from liability for third-party content and
that statutory immunity is not restricted to actions for monetary
damages.6
Furthermore, in 2006, the Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under the Law ("CLC") filed suit against Craigslist for
violations of the FHA for allowing discriminatory advertisement on
its website." The FHA was enacted in 1968 to prohibit discrimination
in most residential dwellings on the bases of race, color, religion, and
country of origin." The two primary reasons for enacting the FHA
were to protect and increase housing choices for individuals who may
otherwise be discriminated against based on their status"s and to
eliminate prejudice of race, religion, sex, familial status, handicap, or
ethnicity in the housing market. 66 Section 3604(c) of the FHA
provides that it is unlawful to make, print, or publish any
discriminatory advertisement, notice or statement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling unit. 67 Liability has been extended to
those who publish discriminatory statements, notices, or
advertisementsi 8
Despite these holdings, the Seventh Circuit held that ISPs cannot
be liable under FHA because of section 230 immunity. 69 Therefore,
ISPs have a monopoly in the market for discriminatory housing
advertisements.
However, in a more recent case, Fair Housing Council v.

Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that there is
no liability for transmitting user-created additional comments, but

60. Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 538, 540.
63. Craigslist,461 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603, 3607 (2012).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 (a),(d),(f) (2012).
66. Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc, v. E. Bergen County Multiple
Listing Services, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (D.N.J. 1976).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
68. United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F. 3d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 2005)(citing
42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c)(1998)).
69. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
70. Shanahan, supra note 6, at 149.
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also no immunity for creating and developing the alleged illegality."
Here, the defendant, Roommates.com, faced three areas of potential
liability: the question and answers sections, the profile pages, and the
"Additional Comments" section. 72 The Ninth Circuit held that
Roommates.com was liable for the contents in the question and
answers section as well as the profile page, but not liable for the user
created "Additional Comments" section.73
The Ninth Circuit found that Roommates.com induced third
parties to express illegal preferences in the question and answer
section. 74 Roommates.com, created the questions and the choices in
the drop-down menus for answers, including sexual orientation of a
roommate. 7 Therefore, by soliciting answers from users that violate
the FHA, Roommates.com could not use section 230 to escape
liability.
The profile section provides information about a subscriber's own
protected statuses as well as roommate preferences.n By prompting
this information and using it as a filtering system for searches,
Roommates.com is outside the protection of section 230.7' However,
the court held that the "Additional Comments" section was covered
by the CDA immunity because Roommates.com does not provide
any specific guidance as to what the comments should pertain to.7
Therefore, a third-party provided the information independently and
Roommates.com was under the shelter of section 230's safe harbor.
The court concluded that "asking questions certainly can violate the
Fair Housing Act and analogous laws in the physical world", but left
content provider immunity intact."o

71. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
72. Id. at 1164-73.
73. Id. at 1162 (holding that section 230 "immunizes providers of interactive
computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties" but? "this
grant of immunity applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an
'information content provider').
74. Id. at 1165.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1165-66.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1167.
79. Id. at 1173-74.
80. Id. at 1164.
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VI. The Aftermath
The lack of liability for websites and ISPs is now threatening long
established civil rights statutes and is intruding upon constitutionally
protected rights." Section 230 has immunized ISPs and websites from
racially discriminatory comments and discrimination in housing."
By allowing discriminatory housing advertisements, the court in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley undermined the spirit of
section 3604(c) of the FHA, and consequently gave websites and ISPs
a monopoly in discriminatory advertisements. Section 230 has gone
completely against its original intent and is now discouraging selfpolicing by taking away any incentive to self-monitor, since
monitoring could lead to waiver of section 230 immunity, and created
a safe haven for inappropriate content.

VII. Proposals
A. Reestablishing Common Law Distributor Liability

In Global Royalties v. Xcentric Ventures, the District Court of
Arizona suggested simply reestablishing the common law distributor
liability and characterizing ISPs and websites as distributors."
However, the court ultimately decided against it, finding it
unworkable without congressional amendment to the CDA." This
solution is not viable because the typical distributor liability would be
too hard to administer due to the thousands of third-party postings on
websites."
It could possibly put some useful websites out of
operation.8 ' Therefore, others have suggested a notice and take down
regime similar to that in the United Kingdom.89

81. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(explaining that section 230 immunity covers ISPs for Title II violations); Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that Roommates.com was immune from FHA violations).
82. Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 532.
83. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d 1157.
84. Lukmire, supra note 9, at 402.
85. Global Royalties v. Xcentric Ventures, No. 07-956-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 2949002
(D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007).
86. Id.
87. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 668-89 (7th Cir. 2008)(Finding that requiring a website to vet millions of postings
would be impractical)
88. Id.
89. DARIO MILO, DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 216 (2008).
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B. Notice and Take Down Statute Modeled on the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.

The DMCA provides that websites and ISPs are immune from
liability for copyright-infringing content posted by third parties if they
do not have actual knowledge and are not aware of the
infringement.' However, websites and ISPs must, "upon obtaining
[knowledge or awareness of the infringement], [act] expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material."" The notification
procedures require plaintiffs to verify copyright ownership as well as
authority to act on behalf of the owner. 2 Once notified, the website
or ISP could incur liability for noncompliance.93
However, copyright infringement is very different from common
law actions. Common law actions, such as defamation, have different
applications depending on the jurisdiction, unlike the federal
copyright statutes. Therefore, in order to comply, websites and ISPs
may be required to vary their approach from claim to claim. With the
Internet's wide breath and reach it would be crippling to e-commerce
"if it is subject to multiple conflicting procedural and substantive
ground rules." 94 Furthermore, it is much "easier to establish who
holds a copyright than whether a statement is defamatory."95
Therefore, the notice and take down model would be overly
burdensome on Internet usage.
C. Carve Out FHA Compliance from Section 230 Immunity

Commentators have differed on their proposed method of FHA
compliance in the context of section 230 immunity. Jennifer Chang
asserts that the CDA does not explicitly state that it overrides the
FHA, and therefore courts must give effect to both statutes.96 Chang
recommends a change in how courts interpret the immunity by giving

90. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).
91. 17 U.S.C § 512 (c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012).
92. Id. at § 512 (C)(3(A)(vi).
93. Id. at §§ 512(c)(1); 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
94. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Internet Law: Lessons
from Europe, 9 NO.11 J. INTERNET L. 3, 7 (2006).
95. Jason C. Miller, Who's Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and
Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13
J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 229, 239 (2008) (describing the ineffectiveness of the first round of
subpoenas in revealing actual identities of Internet posters).
96. Jennifer C. Change, In Search of FairHousing in Cyberspace: The Implication of
the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN L. REV. 969,
1010 (2002).
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more weight to the FHA.9 ' Rachel Kurth also favors this approach,
but differs in her interpretation of the CDA.9 ' She claims that,
because of the repeated use of the phrase "protection for blocking
and screening" in section 230, the statute was only intended to
provide immunity for removal of third-party content. 9 Therefore,
under Kurt's view, courts should eliminate immunity for materials
posted on the sites.'oo
An additional approach suggested by commentators is to amend
the CDA to carve out FHA compliance from section 230 immunity. 0'
These methods suggest barring the section 230 immunity from any
FHA violation claims." While commentators have differed on how
and what to amend, each proposal focuses on the FHA's advertising
provision and not the other civil rights statutes or broader torts
claims.' 03
The problem with these approaches is that they are too narrowly
tailored. These proposals neglect other claims thwarted by the CDA
and would necessitate an onslaught of carve-outs for different
violations. Furthermore, the judicial construction proposals are ill
equipped to solve the section 230 problem because they have not
been endorsed by any court."
D. Bad Faith Exception

One commentator recommended a "Judicially-Created Objective
Bad Faith Exception."'o The proposal asserts that courts should bar
ISPs and websites from using the section 230 immunity if "they acted
unreasonably in either posting or failing to remove defamatory

97. Id. at 1111-12. R16.9
98. Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Free
Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. the Communications Decency Act, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805, 835-36 (2007). R16
99. Id.
100.

Id.

101. See Shanahan, supra note 6, at 154; J. Andrew Crossett, Unfair Housing on the
Internet: The Effect of the Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, 73 Mo.
L.REV. 195, 211 (2008). (asserting that Congress should enact legislation to clarify the
discrepancy between the CDA and FHA).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Matthew T. Wholey, Note: The Internet Is for Discrimination: Practical
Difficulties and Theoretical Hurdles Facingthe Fair Housing Act Online, 60 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 491, 524 (2010).

105. Lukmire, supra note 9, at 407.
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content."'" The author argues that judicial action would be easier to

implement than an amendment to the CDA, and by focusing on
apparent awareness of offending materials, courts can apply a flexible
standard based on the totality of circumstances. 7
This proposal is problematic because it would deter ISPs and
websites from self-monitoring in order to avoid liability. This was the
exact reason for the creation of section 230 immunity. One
commentator states that under the bad faith model, "a website or ISP
acts unreasonably if it either allows defamatory content posting or

fails to remove them once notified."'" Additionally, the author fails
to illustrate how websites and ISPs can prevent or monitor
defamatory postings without significant costs. This model is akin to
distributor liability under common law defamation and eliminates any
incentive to self monitor.
E. Liability as Content Creator or Developer and Liability Under
Rebroadcast Theories.

Section 230 immunity is only available if the information is

"provided by another content provider."109 Virginia Fitt posits that
websites and ISPs could be liable if they give special status to
members who post or solicits creation by "actively encouraging and
0 She
instructing a consumer to gather specific detailed information."o"
theorizes that if a website solicits information and gives special status
to members who post content, it could be held as a creator or
developer, and thus lies outside the scope of section 230 immunity."'
Moreover, Fitt claims that websites and ISPs that repost
information from another ISP or website could be held liable under
rebroadcast theory."2 Under this theory, if website B republishes a
third party statement from website A, it would not be covered by
section 230 immunity, even though website A is in the CDA safe
harbor.
However, both of these solutions would only apply to websites
that solicit and rebroadcast information. Websites and ISPs like
Craigslist or Roommates.com would still be under CDA protection.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 407-409. Id. at 407-09.
108. Lukmire, supra note 9, at 409.
109. See Shanahan,supra note 6, at 139 (citing 47 U.S.C. §230(f)) .
110. Fitt, supra note 13, at 1863 (citing Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the
CommunicationDecency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 202 (2006)).
111. Fitt, supra note 13, at 1863-64.
112. Id. at 1859-60. R16.9
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VIII. Stop Online Piracy Act/Protect IP Act
("SOPA"l"PIPA")
The purpose of the proposed SOPA and PIPA bills is to prevent
the illegal distribution of copyrighted materials on the Internet."'
After years of suing individual users and suing websites under the
DCMA to no avail, media companies lobbied Congress for these
proposed bills to protect their intellectual property. 14
As written, SOPA enforcement includes barring online
advertising networks and payment facilitators from conducting
business with websites in violation."' It also bars search engines from
linking to such sites, and requires ISPs to block access to such sites."'
PIPA applies to the same parties. In addition, it can be served on
"information location tools to require them to stop financial
transactions with the rogue site and remove links to it.""
Opponents of the bills argue that they would hinder innovation,"'
do not do enough to protect against false accusations,"' and threaten
free speech. 20 Therefore, voting on the PIPA bill was postponed and
an alternative is being drafted as of February 2012.121 Even without
the obvious differences between copyright and defamation, civil
rights infringements, and other torts, the proposed actions in PIPA
and SOPA are not viable solutions for limiting section 230 as
evidenced by all the opposition against these bills.
IX. Proposed Solution
One solution is to treat ISPs and websites that conduct business
through the Internet as distributors. The determination of whether a
website or ISP qualifies for immunity would be similar to the personal
jurisdiction test for websites in Zippo Manufacturing Company v.

113. Larry Magid, What Are SOPA and PIPA And Why All The Fuss?, FORBES (Jan.
18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/18/what-are-sopa-and-pipa-andwhy-all-the-fuss/.
114. Id.
115. Jared Newman, SOPA and PIPA: Just the Facts, PC WORLD (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:00
p.m.), http://www.pcworld.com/article/248298/sopa-and-pipa-just-the-facts.html.
116. Id.
117. Protect
IP
Act,
WIKIPEDIA
(Feb.
5,
2012),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PROTECTIPAct#citenote-10.
118. Condon, supra note 2.
119. Newman, supra note 115 (stating that payments to websites accused of violation
could be cutoff before validity of claims are assessed).
120. Protect IP Act, supra note 116.
121. Id.
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Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 122 There, the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania held that there were three levels of Internet
connectivity:123 (1) websites that clearly does business over the
Internet;124 (2) websites where a user can exchange information with
the host;125 and 3) websites that simply post information.126 For our
purposes, the first category will not qualify for CDA protection. The
second category will also not qualify for immunity if there is enough
interactivity and the exchanged information is of a commercial
nature. Finally the third category will only qualify if the information
was not solicited or where the ISPs or websites knew or should have
known the information was defamatory or against protected civil
rights.
Thus, if applied to Roommates.com, the defendant
Roommates.com would not qualify for section 230 immunity because
it would be classified as a website clearly doing business on the
Internet. The same applies to websites such as Craigslist, where the
whole purpose is to generate business. Therefore, if a website
generates income through user provided content or if its revenue is
based on viewership of third party content, then it does not qualify
for section 230 immunity and would be required to self-monitor.
These websites are profitable, and the additional cost imposed by
distributor liability would not cripple their growth. This would
eliminate the competitive advantage created by the expansive reading
of section 230 immunity for ISPs and websites over traditional media
and protect constitutionally protected rights.
X. Conclusion
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court realized that the
Internet has become "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication."1 27 Twenty-five years later, we are still
dealing with the repercussions of their decision to leave section 230

122. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
123. Id. at 1124.
124. Id. (involving the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the
Internet) 16.9
125. Id. (determining whether there is enough "business" depends on the balancing of
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs
on the website).
126. Id.
127. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-850 (1997).
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immunity intact.'28 The idea that the Ilnternet will organically self
regulate has past. As the ninth circuit held in Batzel v. Smith, "there
is no reason inherent in the technological features of cyberspace why
First Amendment and defamation law should apply differently in
cyberspace than in the brick and mortar world."' 29
Congress must reign in the expansive section 230 immunity.
When Zeran was decided, the Ilnternet was at its infancy, now with
twenty-five years of experience, it must be overturned. ISPs and
websites must be held as distributors and cannot violate the FHA. In
order not to hinder growth or innovation, such designations can be
limited to those websites that garner financial benefits from thirdparty content. However, action must be taken.

128. Since then courts have expanded the section 230 immunity to cover civil rights
violations, torts, contracts, and defamation cause of actions. See supra Part IV-V.
129. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).

